编者按：近日，中国人民大学重阳金融研究院客座研究员 李珊珊在发表英文文章强调，随着市场对美国货币政策管控能力的信心动摇，通胀风险上升，资本流动波动加剧。政策缓冲空间不足的新兴市场或将首当其冲承受冲击。现将中文译文与英文原文发布如下： （中文译文约1900字，预计阅读时间5分钟）

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随着市场对美国货币政策管控能力的信心动摇，通胀风险上升，资本流动波动加剧。政策缓冲空间不足的新兴市场或将首当其冲承受冲击。

随着美国政坛对美联储施加的政治压力持续升温，其引发的连锁反应正迅速波及全球。太平洋投资管理公司（PGIM）固定收益联席首席投资官格雷戈里・彼得斯（Gregory Peters）指出，向美联储施压实属“自摆乌龙”——这一自酿的冲击会侵蚀市场信心，更难以实现为美国降低借贷成本的预期目标。

市场已悄然出现“抛售美资产” 的交易行为，这种对美国货币政策的重估正逐步显现。

其危害范围远不止于华盛顿，还会给通胀走势埋下长期隐患，导致全球金融体系更加碎片化与低效，而亚洲、拉美和非洲的新兴市场及发展中经济体（EMDE）成为最大的受影响方。诚然，这些后果由多重因素引发，但对美联储独立性的质疑无疑是核心动因之一。

官方外汇储备的配置动向，最能直观体现这场重估。各国央行和全球投资者纷纷增持传统避险资产，黄金成为最大受益者。截至 2025年3季度末，黄金在全球官方外汇储备中的占比已接近30%。作为全球第二大储备资产，黄金占比的优势较欧元进一步扩大。

但黄金储备的再度增持也伴随着宏观层面的权衡取舍。与储备货币不同，黄金无法提供流动性支持，也不能在危机时期为融资机制保驾护航。当更多全球储蓄涌入无收益资产，国际金融体系应对冲击的灵活性会逐步下降。市场普遍的避险行为，可能会降低资本配置效率，削弱全球金融体系的抗风险能力。

这些影响对新兴市场的冲击更甚。受限于金融市场发展不成熟、官方储备中黄金占比偏低，新兴市场出现了私人投资者与央行同步增持黄金的双重趋势。2021年末至2025年1季度末，EMDE的黄金储备占比从6.9%大幅攀升至11.4%。在亚洲，中国和印度的这一趋势尤为显著，2025年上半年，两国合计贡献了全球金条和金币需求的53%。

对于人均资本存量较低，制造业、基础设施和科技领域存在巨大融资缺口的经济体而言，这样的资产配置转向背后，暗藏着机会成本的考量。理论上讲，资本持续涌入非生息资产会加剧资本错配，若这一趋势不断累积，或将对长期经济增长引擎形成抑制。

市场的避险需求还进一步蔓延至其他贵金属领域。国际货币基金组织着重指出了持续的通胀风险：铜价每上涨1%，核心通胀在一年后会上升约0.02 个百分点，两年后则会上升约0.3个百分点。对于印度这类金属进口大国，或是越南等制造业中心，这一影响可能会被进一步放大。

此轮美元走弱源于美国风险溢价的快速上升，而非平稳、有序的贬值，这进一步加大了新兴市场金融体系的不确定性。2025年，印度卢比和印尼盾的汇率均跌至历史低位附近。

此外，全球投资者可能会质疑，未来危机来临时，美联储是否仍有能力维护全球金融稳定。这种预期转变会推高新兴市场的风险利差，部分外债高企的拉美和非洲国家或将成为最大受害者。相较于美元，黄金的流动性短板也可能制约各国央行应对危机的能力，对于外汇储备规模有限、高度依赖美元融资的非洲国家而言，这一问题尤为突出。

因此，美联储独立性的公信力受损，恐将酿成一场堪称“多输”的结局——美国和世界其他地区都将难逃其害。

值得关注的是，此次全球市场的反应实属罕见。多国央行行长和美联储前官员公开出面支持现任美联储主席，实属史上罕见。数十年来，美联储一直是新兴市场央行践行专业货币政策的标杆与锚点。从2008年全球金融危机到2020年新冠疫情，每逢系统性危机，正是美联储的机构公信力，促成了各国快速的政策协调，重建了市场信心。

当外界对美国货币政策管控能力的信心日渐动摇，其溢出效应会通过汇率、资本流动和风险溢价等渠道席卷全球，而政策缓冲空间不足的新兴市场，将承担更沉重的调整成本。老话说得依旧没错：美联储打个喷嚏，世界大半地区都会感冒。

当然，这并非意味着美联储的独立性应等同于脱离外界监督。缺乏问责的独立会滋生自满，而失去独立性的问责则易招致政治操控。对于在美联储决策中几乎没有话语权的新兴市场而言，这关乎全球经济的公平性。加强对美联储货币政策制定过程和流动性操作的监督，不仅能重塑市场对美国经济治理能力的信心，也有助于稳固全球经济和金融稳定的脆弱根基。

美联储的公信力不仅是美国的战略资产，更是支撑全球贸易、投资与增长的全球公共产品。在这个零和博弈政治与体系碎片化的时代，这是少数能让各国的理性自利与全球稳定达成一致的领域之一。

英文原文

Opinion | Why the Fed credibility crisis will hit emerging markets harder

Li Shanshan

As confidence in US monetary stewardship falters, inflation risks rise and capital flows become more volatile. Emerging markets with fewer policy buffers will bear the brunt.

Shanshan Li Published: 4:30pm, 22 Feb 2026

As political pressure on the US Federal Reserve intensifies in Washington, the reverberations are rippling across the globe. Gregory Peters, co-chief investment officer of fixed income at PGIM, has noted that bringing political pressure to bear on the Fed is an “own goal” – a self-inflicted shock that erodes confidence and is unlikely to deliver lower borrowing costs for the US.

This reassessment – marked by quiet “sell America” trades – is beginning to surface.

The damage extends far beyond Washington. It creates long-term risks to inflation trajectories and could push the global financial system towards greater fragmentation and inefficiency, leaving emerging markets and developing economies in Asia, Latin America and Africa most exposed. To be sure, these consequences stem from multiple factors, but doubts over the Fed’s independence are undoubtedly one of the key drivers.

The most revealing signal of this reassessment is visible in official reserve behaviour. Central banks and global investors have increased their exposure to traditional safe havens, with gold emerging as a primary beneficiary. By the third quarter of 2025, gold accounted for close to 30 per cent of global official reserves. As the world’s second-largest reserve asset, its share advantage over the euro has widened.

Yet the renewed accumulation of gold also carries macroeconomic trade-offs. Unlike reserve currencies, gold does not provide liquidity backstops or support crisis-era funding mechanisms. When more global savings flow into non-yielding assets, the international financial system becomes less flexible to shocks over time. A widespread flight to safety may undermine the efficiency of capital allocation and weaken the resilience of the global financial system.

These effects weigh heavily on emerging markets. Constrained by shallow financial markets and lower gold shares in official reserves, emerging markets have experienced a dual shift towards gold for private investors and central banks.

The share of gold in the reserves of emerging markets and developing economies’ central banks rose sharply from 6.9 per cent in late 2021 to 11.4 per cent by the end of the first quarter of 2025. In Asia, this trend is particularly pronounced in China and India, which together accounted for 53 per cent of global demand for gold bars and coins in the first half of 2025.

For economies with relatively low per capita capital stocks and substantial investment gaps in manufacturing, infrastructure and technology, such shifts raise questions about opportunity costs. In theory, persistent capital flows into non-interest-bearing assets will worsen capital misallocation and, if accumulated to a sufficient extent, may exert a dampening effect on long-term growth engines.

Renewed demand has increasingly spread to other precious metals. The International Monetary Fund highlights persistent inflationary risk: a 1 per cent rise in copper prices lifts core inflation by roughly 0.02 percentage points after a year, and by around 0.3 percentage points after two years. For countries reliant on metal imports like India, or manufacturing hubs like Vietnam, the impact is amplified even further.

The dollar’s weakness reflects rising US risk premiums rather than a steady, orderly depreciation, amplifying uncertainty in emerging market financial systems. The Indian rupee and Indonesian rupiah both traded near historic lows in 2025.

Furthermore, global investors may question the Fed’s ability to underpin global financial stability in future crises. Such a shift in expectations will push up emerging market risk spreads. Some Latin American or African countries with high external debt ratios are likely to bear the brunt.

Gold’s poor liquidity relative to the dollar may also constrain central banks’ capacity in dealing with crises. This is particularly true for African countries, with their limited reserve levels and a heavy reliance on US dollar funding.

The erosion of confidence in the Fed’s independence therefore risks producing what might best be described as a “multi-lose” outcome – one in which neither the US nor the rest of the world emerges unscathed.

What is striking is how unusual the global reaction has been. Central bankers and former Fed officials have rarely intervened so publicly in defence of a sitting Fed chair. For decades, the Fed has stood as both a benchmark and an anchor for professionalism among central banks of emerging markets. During periods of systemic stress – from the 2008 global financial crisis to the recent pandemic – it was the Fed’s institutional standing that enabled rapid coordination and confidence-building across borders.

As confidence in the US monetary stewardship falters, the spillovers ripple across the globe, through exchange rates, capital flows and risk premiums, and the cost of adjustments falls more heavily on emerging markets with fewer policy buffers. The adage still holds: when the Fed sneezes, much of the world catches a cold.

None of this means that the Fed’s independence should equate to insulation from scrutiny. Independence without accountability breeds complacency; accountability without independence invites political capture. For emerging markets, which have little say in Fed decisions, it is a matter of global economic fairness. Strengthening oversight of the Fed’s monetary policy deliberations and liquidity operations would not only bolster confidence in US economic stewardship but also help sustain the fragile foundations of the global economy and financial stability.

The Fed’s credibility is more than an American strategic asset – it is a global public good that underpins global trade, investment and growth. In an era defined by zero-sum politics and fragmentation, this is one of the few areas where enlightened self-interest and global stability still clearly align.

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